Official Eighth Districtiatst'
F~area used to represent the Eighth

Dktrict for this article includes the 4th and 6th Farm Credit Districts of Louisville and St. Louis and is bounded by the heavy black line.
l"lCBs function as intermediaries that package these loanable funds for-, as of October 1985, 318 Production Credit Associations I PCAsI, who icr tur'n, make loans directly to farmer-s for' annual oper'ating expenses. 'l'lie FLBs make loans to farmer's for' the pur-chase of far'mland thr'or.rgh a raetwor-k of 390 F'eder'al Land Bank Associations that firnction as loan originating offices. Banks for Cooper-atives mnake loans to farmer--owned cooper-atives, such as sirpply stores. As of December' 31, 1984 , the Farm Credit System, exclusive of the Banks for-Cooper-atives, held $67.9 billion, or' 32 percent, of total far-m debt, Of this total, FLBs held $49.1 billion and PCAs held $17.9 billion. FICBs held the remaining $0.9 billion in the form of loans to other financial institutions.
The Far-rners Home Administration IFmHAI is the so-called "lender of last r-esor't" to far-mers. It extends credit to far-rner-s thr-ough dir-ect loans, guarantees of farm loans made and serviced by coniriiercial banks, and variosrs eniergency loan pr-ograrris. FmHA, for-the most par-t, lends to far-rner-s when they have tr-ouble servicing debt acquir-ed fiom other lenders or if credit is riot available at 'reasonable" interest r'ates from their-cur-rent lender-s. As of 1984, FmHA held $25.7 billion, or-12 percent, of total farm debt.
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on-real estate debt, or' oper-ating debt, associated with the variable costs of far-rn pr-oduction. Because farm lending by commer-cial banks is pr-imanly forshort-term opet-ating debt, their-chief sour-ce of competition is the Production Cr-edit Associations IPCAsI of the Far-rn Credit System.
The cooperative Far-rn Credit System IFCSI is a system of federally charter-ed, but privately owned, banks and associations, which ar-c or-ganized as cooper-atives, These banks are supervised and examined by the Far-rn Cr-edit Adrninisti-ation, an independent agency of the United States gover-ninent, and ar-c mandated by their-charter to make loans only for' pun-poses directly related to agr-icultur-e. The FCS consists of 12 districts arid 37 banks: 12 Federal Land Banks IFLBsI, 12 Federal triter-mediate Credit Banks IFfCB5I and 13 Bamiks for Cooper-atives I BCsI.
't'he F'CS obtains loanable funds by the sale of secur-ities thr-ough the system's Wall Street firriding ar-ni, the F'ecler-al I"ar'rn Cr-edit Banks Funding Corpor-ation. 'the A convenient place to begin a r-eview of far-rn debt holdings and pr-oblenis is an analysis of trencis in loans outstanding at the var-ious lender's. Table I pr-esents the mar-ket shar-es of nori-r'eal estate agr'icultin-al debt held by the major lerader-s since 1970 fur' both the Eighth Distr-ict, br-oadly defined, and for-the remainder of the U.S. Non-r-eal estate debt r'epresents financing for annual oper-ating expenses such as feed, fertilizer-and seed, as well as for the purchase of far-rn machinery and livestock, The category of -'All Others" includes such lender's as private individuals, dealer-s and merchants.
'I'he trends in the District and the United States are r-oughiv par-allel and indicate that both commercial banks and the FCS gained their-highest rnar-ket shares in the mid-1970s and until recently have been steadily losing market share to the F'mHA. By the end of t984, commercial banks at both the District and national levels r-ever'sed the 10-year downtn-enid, showing significant mar-ket shar'e gains over' 1983. Table 2 pr-esents the mar-ken shan'es held by lender-s for farm real estate loans, The lender category of ''Insun-er-s' has been added to r'eflect the significant pies- ence of a number-of insun'ance companies in far-miand lending. The "All Other's" category for real estate lending mainly repr-esents debt held by individuals. The tn-ends ar-c again consistent across the Distr-ict and the United States. Although commer-cial banks in the District hold a lan-ger-share of the farm n-cal estate debt than banks in the r-emainden-of the U.S., banks in both ar-eas have seen steady declines in rnarket shar-e after' initial gains in the ear-hi 1970s, lnsurance companies and the category of'"i~llOthers" also have exhibited secular' declines in mar-ket share in both ar-eas. The share losses of these three lender gr-oups have accrued almost entirely to the Feder-al Land Banks of the h-CS. At both the Disttict and U.S. levels, the FCS has riearly doubled its man-ket share with steady gr-owth over the period since 1970. 'the FmHA share, however-, has remained largely unchanged over the same period, although minor-gains ar-c evident in the Distr-ict. tn summary, the mar'ket share data indicate that, for far-rn operating debt, the FrnHA has posted shar-p gains since the rnid-1970s at the expense of comrner'cial banks and the PCAs. The farm real estate mar-ket, however, has been dotmnated by the shar'p gains made by the Fedenal Land Banks r-elative to the share losses of most other major fan'm lenders.~n
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The major causes of the recent farm debt defaults are erroneous forecasts -both by farmers arid tlieir creditors of continued high and acceler-atinig hiflation and increased r-eal r'etur-ns to assets eniiploved in agriculture.' So long as land pr-ices continued to n-ise with inflation, the collater-al base against which farmers could but-row increased, and the value of dollars used to repay the debt decreased. In conjunction with tax advantages for land ownership and the availability of subsidized credit for' land purchases, it made sense to buy fanniilanid at prices of $3,000-84,000
per acie -ifthe purchaser believed the land could be resold at a higher price. Siriiilar-lv, under' the expectation of world food shortages arid increases in r'eal comniodity prices, the price of land in agricultural pniiductioni would be expected to rise.' Under these conditions, both farmer-s and their-lender-s agr-eed than extending niiore credit on a r'ising nominal asset base was a prudent business decision. Utifor'tunately for both par-ties, however, their' for-ecasts of inflation and commodity pr-ices were ser-iously in er-i-or-, See Benongia (1985) . 4 See, for example, Will There Be Enough Food? (1981) .
This description of events suggests that inistitirtions who increased their' lending to agricultur-e shar-plv between 1974-31 -when inflation, for-eign demand for-U.S. far-ni pr-oducts and r-eal commodity prices wer-e inicr'easing or-wer-e expected to md-ease shar-plvshould be experiencing the greatest deter-ior-ation in portfolio quality.
On the basis of this cr'nter-ron, the Far'm Creclit Svstern and FruHA should be experiencing r'elativelv mor-e trouble with por-tfolio per-for-manice than other far-rn lenders. 'to assess this thesis, we now tur'ni to a discussion of riieasur'es of loan quality and por-tfolio perI or-niance. rn"~o~c; nail i:F F! Ba and .FCla A coniriion measure of loan quality is the per-centage of loans on which payments are delinquent. This per-centage tends to be a leading indicator' of ultimate loan losses because bor-rower's who eventually default on debt fir-st exper-ienice pr-oblems with ruakimig their scheduled pavriierits. If efforts to r-eschedule the loan arid to service only its ititer-est obligation fail. the delinquent loan becomes, after some lag, a loan loss. The data r-equir-ed for this analysis are difficult to obtain arid are not entir-ely conipar-able acr-oss differerit lender-s and even across differ-emit geographical ar-eas for the sariie lender gr-oup. The shaded inser't discusses the data used in this ar-tide and sonic caveats that should be exercised when making compar-isons or drawinig infer-enices from these series, Char-t I plots loan delinquency r-ates for' El Bs in the U.S. and the Eighth District, broadly defined chart 2 plots the loan loss series for FLBs. In each case, these scres ar-C defined to lie the dollar value of loanis on which payments ar-e deliniqirent or-the dollar' value of loan losses as a pen-cent of total loans outstanding.
The FUR series indicate that these institutions have experienced simnilar' patten-ns arid rates of loan delin-(luencies and losses both in the District arid in the r-eniamnider' of the U.S. Loan losses at District l-'LBs, 5 Markel share data as a proxy for loan quality should be applied with some caution. Moreover, it should be noted that this measure is better suined to long-term land mortgages than to short-term operating loans. The reasoning is as follows: If market share for mortgage lending declined in the 1970s, subsequent portfonio quality might be improved because fewer new loans (that turned out to be poor loans) were extended and the old loans carried forward were of higher quality if, for no other reason, because a larger share of the principal had been repaid. For annual operating loans, however, market share in a given year may be unrelated to loan quality. In fact, the lower interest rates offered by PCAs in much of the 1970s may have attracted the more creditworthy farmers, 1 r,min'-, ;,ninl ,Lmn' rrrmn~Imlr'i 1 nrn\.tnr'nnl Iii ziln-rI in pnn~irIm ri~nl~t mint ,n\mmnl,IIr!,' ,bsn'~~irr'nr'I l,,nil~,. hal,ninrn' slmn'n'n intl inmr'nrrmnr -n.rm,-mnnt'rnl
In! ltlm-'l rio wmrnlr-hniu's~~ei'i a~,mrl,nhiIn' rn assrmir turn n-mi Un'ni nalr2nnnir---mnIn'nilmn~II'nr'u,Innmy'rr llial n'v 1 nnnilrnmg .n,nnnrLrn'ds mu ''nil mlelnrtlmiunr'\ mitlmni,nl mmiii miii Irn.nmrs ,nnmnl I:mmmnm n'r ii mmnlrri'nmumliiiii~~r'in' r'mnimsm,-IemmIl~~n 1 ,,nlmr'iI .rr n'rnss hr I,ntn mn',iil~-rmnil',l,nmirinmiznnii Iii'',' nrnrInnnt~nI:ilr I_~In' iii t r''rhmi l)i-~rm rI-Inn,-.Ir I liii mnthnrr'n's ni lint rrn-,nslr'rim rim mlii' rial,, her' nnn',r' 11131 rI,'t.n ISajnl~-, l,,e,r' Iiruin It' n 1 ninir-rI Inn i'n' 1 imrr'l hin,nni hum r'rrlhrr li-rh in iii~rir'bnmiihn,nmr., nhr,rl \'rn'n nrr,nhnI1 however', have risen slightly mon-c shar-ply than at ELBs in the r'eriiainder-of the U S.' Mon-eover-, then-c appeal's to be a lag of about two~'ear-siii each case between the time delinquencies r'ise shan-plv 119821 arid hater' n'eveah thieniselves in higher loan losses 119841. Note, however, that while the patter'ns of delinquency anr.h loan loss r'ates have been siniilan-, loan losses have been about one-tenth of prior' year's' delinquencies. Chant I also shows that dehinquenc~t'ates were nearly constant between 1970-81. Ps-ion to 1981, losses at FLBs~ves-e less than two-tenths of one percent of all loans nutstanding.
PCi~loan delinquency data are riot available on a consistent basis for both the Distm-ict and the r'eniainden' of the U.S. I-on this reason, only the Distrct delinquency data are shown mi chart 3. They also r'eveal a dramatic micr-ease in delinquency s-ates beginning in 6 U.S. and District FLB delinquency rates are derived from Farm Credit Administration annual reports and include the items of 'nonaccrual loans" and delinquent principal and advances.
1982. It must be pointed out thiat the absolute levels o: delinquency a-ates for' PCAs are not compan-able witlt he FL8 n-ates pon-tra~edin char't 1. Loan loss data (or' PCAs, howeve r,ar'e available for both the District and the U.S. amid are pn'esented in char't 4. Wnite-ofts in 1984 as a per-cent of total loans were eight times highien-than the pen'centage in 1981 In contrast to FLU loans, however', there appean's to hr almost rio lag between the time these deli iquenicief ar-e nepnr'ted and the time they result mi loan losses 'l'he likely reason for this difference is that PCAs niakn eriod include loans which are termed "loans in process of liquida' tion" and which are not comparable no the District data. In spite 01 the different nature of the Iwo series, the data exhibit very similar behavior when plotted against each other on the basis of annua percentagechanges rather than as absolute levels of delinquency. Return on Equity Production Credit Associations loans for an individual year's operating expenses and usually schieduhe m'epavmerit shoi'tlv after the yeas-s lian'est. For this m'eason, unlike the FUlls' multi-year' loans for land purchases, PCAs tend to exhibit a closer short-run r'ehationship between delinquencies and losses. As in the case of FLBs, it is nlecessan'v to niote that -while the pat ten'ns of delinquency arid loan loss rates are similar', losses have been one-fifth of delinquencies.
With t-ising rates of delinquencies and loan losses one also would expect the returns to equity and assets held by these lender's to decline, Charts 5 and 6 plot the netul'ns to equity fot FLBs and PCAs, respectively in the U.S. and the District. In chart 5, similar patterns for n-eturns in the U.S. and the District are r'evealed wstli the Distrct showing lower average r'etur'ns since 1979 and a shan-per decline since the 1982 peak of 10.4 pen-cent. Retur-ns to equity (or PCAs Fchar't SF peaked in 1980 for the U.S. atid 1981 for the District and have fallen sharply in just two years. Returns to assets have followed siniilar patter'ns for these lender-s at both District and national levels.'.
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'the conjecture was that agricultural tianks, which did not mci-ease nian'ket shar-e or dohlarvolume of farnii iOans as aggressively mi the 1970s, would show' somewhat lower' nreasur'es of loan delinquencies and losses and tietter returns to assets and equity than member's of the Fan'm Credit System . Anothen' important factor supporting this expectatron is the fact that the loan portfolios of agn-icr.nltun'al banks an'e diver'sified outsiue of agricultural lending. This loan diven'sit~' could help protect batik ear-nings from the wide swings of retuniis On equity experienced Lw the ["CS lenders who extend credit only for purposes directly related to agr'icultur-e. 
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Total Loan Losses as a Percent of Total Loans Agricunnnnh md Noranric.ntnrrt Banks
Agricultural loan delinquency data have been collected fn'om conimer'ciah banks since 1982. UnIv banks with total assets gr'eater than $100 million, however. ar-c required to n'epor't the volumes of agr-icul t or-al loans considered in noniaccn-ual or r'eniegotiated status. These two categories include loans on which interest paynienits are riot being paid or are being paid nion-e slowly than originally established. Since a large niajorrtv of agrncul tural banks are smaller' than $100 million and ther-elon'e do niot n-epor't nioniacci'uah arid renegotiated agr'icul ton-al loans, chiar't 7 plots only the percentage of agricultural production loans that an'e considered past due by 3Q days or' more at agn'icultur'al banks .~These data, then'ehuin'e, i~,n'enot rlin-ectly cornparable with the PCA data sunimanized earlier in chant 3. Nonetheless, these limited data suggest that agricultural banks also have experienwed rapid in cr'eases in '.The set of banks defined as agricultural banks will change overtime as the shares of agricultural loans in some banks portfolios become less than or greater than the cutoff point. Over time, however, the number of agricultural banks has remained fairly constant, ranging between 5,668 in 1974 and 4,970 in 1984. delinquent farm debt both in the District and in th remainder-of the t 1,5,''.
Loan loss data for' agn'icuh I un'ah banks pn'ovnde achditional iniformation to supplement that pn-ovided In past due rates. Because loan loss c lata are not avai habl( specifically for' ags'icultur'al loans, chant 8 is a plot of al loan losses at agr'icultun-al banks and at small nnonagr'i cultt.rr'al banks in the nation I hess than 5100 million ir total assets I expressed as a percentage of all loans aI these banks since 1976. It indicates that loan losses al agnicultun'al banks have been in cr-easing steadily sinc 1979. The rate of increase has been such that tIn her'cent of loan losses hias r'isen by a factor-of nean'l\ seven since 1979. Losses at connpan'ablv sized nonagr'i cultun'al banks wer'e Iar-ger than losses at agn'icultun-a banks until 1981. Now the n-ate of losses at nonagnicul '°Forthe small number of agricultural banks reporting all agriculturn loan delinquencyitems (29 banks in the District for 1 g84 and 75 i the remainder of the U.S.), the delinquency rate rose from 4. percent in 1982 to 9.0 percent in 1984 for the District. In th remainder of the U.S., however, the overall delinquency rate ros only from 6.1 percent in 1982 to 6.3 percent in 1984, Given the sma number of agricultural banks reporting these data, caution in the interpretation must be used. Return on Equity Agricrhlmrnh and Namngnicnlnrnrah Banks torah banks is ttnn'al banks, only half that experienced by agriculloss n'esen'es.' ' 'l'he latter two items ne present the n'esources of a hank to absorb loan losses. At the niational level, the noun her of agn'ic n.nltu n'ah ban ks that Fall into tI w thn n-eatenecl bank category has nearly tn-ipled lion 1982 to I 984, going fn'om 76 to 202. In the District, however-, the number of such threatened institutions has doubled fr-ow 23 to 46 over the same period. Thus, concern about rapid in ca-eases in farm bank tail tm 'es, although certainly important in the Eighth District appear's to be even mon'e mlpor'tant for' institutions beyond the bonder's ot the Eighth District
In sinmmam-v, agricultural banks have stnfThn'ed rising r-ates of del imiquencv arid loan losses and declining pn-olitahilitv. When corn pared with PCAs, which m-epn'esent their most signiificanit competiton-s in the agr'ieultun'al lending arena, hioweven', banks appear-to have survived recent downitur'ns mi the agn'icultur'al econoniv in much better fashion, Although loan loss r'ates for PCAs and agn-icuhtun'al banks ar-c conipan'abhe, delinqttencv n-ates have increased, and pn'ofitability deer-eased mon-c qiticklv at PCAs than at agn'ictnltun'al banks.
'the k'a,'niens Home .4dmkti/i;-atknrt
'tine E"mHA's n'ole as ''lender of last a-eson't'' dictates 78 80 82 1984 that its borrower's an-c from a higli-n-isk category. Loan delinquency data for both n-eat estate and non-realestate farm loans bean' this out, Charts 10 and 11 document the steady a-ise in delinquency n'ates for' both loan categor-ies. Compan'isons of delinquency r'ates at FCS lender-s Ichar-ts 1 and 31 with those of Lhe F'mFL'~are inistr-uctiye, The FmHA appear-s to have experieniced rising delinquency rates earlier than 1981 when the ECS lenden-s began to show mar-ked incr-eases in delinquencies. This finding is to be expected given the char-acter' of the FmHA's borrower' clientele. F'nitlA borrower's would be more likely to exhibit n-epavment pr-oblems when a downitur'n in the agn'icultn.rn'al economy occur's than would the niore creditwor'thv bor'n'owem's of the F'CS or of agn-icultural baniks, 't'hiis also highlights an impon'tant aspect of the Based on r-etun-ns to equ it\' data at agricultur'aI banks and at small nonagr'icultur'al banks of the Distn-ict lchan't 91, profitability mi tIne Distn'ict peaked hi 1974 and hias been falling steadily since then, with the exceptions of 1979 and 1980. At the national level, agn'icultun-ah bank profitability peaked in 1980 befon'e stan'ting a sharp decline. As in the case of loan losses, agrculttrn'ah banks' declining pn'ofitahilitv was greater than that expen'ieniced 1w nonagr-iet,altur-al banks, Rettrn'nis to equity at Distr'ict agricultural banks have fallen by nearly 34 per'ceait sitice them' recent peak in 1979, while tIne r-etun'ns to equity ratio for' nonagricultural banks in the Distn'ict has fallen by only 16 pen-cent since 1979, One fun'then-means of assessing the viability of agricn.nhtur'al banks is by compan'ing the volume of ''risky'' loans for which repavriients an'e uncertain with a hank's ability to abson-h the potential loss. With this in mind, banks whose viability may be thn-eatened can be defined as those fbn-which the volume of delinquent loans exceeds the sum of total bank capital and loan "The FDIC compiles the official list of "problem banks" by rating all insured banks on the basis of five categories: capital, assets, management, earnings and liquidity. Banks receiving a rating of four or five on a scale from one to five are placed on the problem bank list, Our definition, which focuses on capital and asset quality, is likely to provide a parallel indicator of banks threatened by bankruptcy should a large share of delinquent loans become loan losses, ". Melichar 
Percent of Total Farm Ownership Loans Delinquent
Farmers Home Administration l'nitlA -as a lender of last m'esom't, the EmbiA provides an informal stnbsidv to the h"CS and agn'icuhtun'al banks thin'ough its din'ect lending pn'ogn'ams. By lending in sonic cases to farmer's who had received h'CS or bank financing hut who an'e rio longer' consider'ed creditwor'ttiv, the F'mHA allows these lender's to delay foreclosur'e anid to continue to r'eceftc loan pavniieni ts fn'om such horrowen's, Moreover', unden' the Ecotioni ic Emen'gencv Cn'edit Act, F'niHA n'efinanced loans on'iginallv made hv the l-'CS and commercial ban ks and n'epaid the on'iginal lender-s fn'om proceeds of the t"nil IA loan.
Given the extneninelv high and rapidly gn'owinig dehinquencv r'ates on F'niFlA loans, one would expect. other' things equal~to find comnienisur-atelv higher' levels of loani losses. Loami loss data for F'mh-IA farm loan prograriis are available only on a consolidated basis Ii.e., farm ownen'ship and open'ating loani losses are niot segn'egatedl. Chan't 12, however', shows low, ahthoughi rising, rates of loan wr-ite-offs, F'on' example, the 1984 delinquency rate on Frnl-tA fam'm ownien'ship loans was near' 25 pen'r.ent, hut only 0.22 percent of all Fm HA toanis were charged off, 'bEds contrasts with the II ii': 1984 delinquency n'ate of 3 pem'cetfl and loan n change oft's of 1.5 percent. 'fhis discrepancy between instilu tiomIs can be explained by thie gr'eaten-degn'ee of tor hearance that the F'nnHA has exhibited with respect tm its delinquent bor'n'owen's, As e~idenceof this fom'hicar ance. data on thie lengthi of time that loans are can'ned in the delinquent stattns can be examined. While no available on a Distn'ict scale, national Fm HA data mdi cate that, as of June 30, 1985, more than 45 pen'ceti I o the volume of deliniquenit h-'ol-iA farm loans has been in that status fon' mom'e than foun' year's. UnIv 9 hien'cen of the deluiquencies nationwide wen'e tess than onm year past due.
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The Farm Cn'edit Svstern and agn'icultur'al banks rift riot show substantial deten'ion'ation of loan portfoli( quality until 1982. The FniHA, howeyem', began to cx hihit rising delinquency r'ates in 1979. 'I'he deter-ion-a tioni has been more pn'onounced among those lendern 
